Luck greased the way of Adolph Hitler on many an occasion,
from before he was born in fact, when an obscure Austrian customs official
named Alois Schicklgruber changed his name to Alois Hitler. It’s the first
revelation in Hubris, the first volume of Ian Kershaw’s biography of Hitler. “Adolf can be believed,” Kershaw writes,
“when he said that nothing his father had
done had pleased him so much as to drop the coarsely rustic name of
Schicklguber. Certainly, `Heil Schicklgruber’ would have sounded an unlikely
salutation to a national hero.”
Luck, in plentiful measure, greased the path of this misfit
and mediocre artist to absolute power in the first modern totalitarian
state—luck and the self-interested calculation, rationalization, prevarication
and cowardice of a great many enablers along the way. It’s a fascinating story
told by a master historian and fine writer; his command of the material,
primary and secondary sources, and his range over the factors—social, cultural
and political—that helped to make Hitler possible is remarkable. It’s the
riddle of how Hitler happened that drew Kershaw, originally a medievalist, to
Hitler. Among Hitler and Third Reich historians (for all of whom, this is the
question: how did it happen?) Kershaw is a “structuralist,” focusing on the
structure of German society that allowed the man to become who he became,
rather than the man himself. In a preface entitled, “Reflecting on Hitler,”
Kershaw meditates on the myriad difficulties facing a biographer confronted
with the figure of Hitler. “What has continued in the writing of the book to
interest me more than the strange character of the man who held Germany’s fate
in his hands between 1933 and 1945 is the question of how Hitler was
possible…….If the answer to that question cannot be presumed in the first
instance to lie in those attributes, such as they were, of Hitler’s
personality, then it follows that the answer must be sought chiefly in German
society—in the social and political motivations which went into the making of Hitler.”
He dispenses with quickly (and, one senses, has little
patience with) some of the stuff that has floated around over the decades to
“explain” Hitler—an occluded Jewish ancestry; deformed genitals; sexual
eccentricity or perversity; a Jewish doctor who may have been responsible for
his mother’s death. These are all either unknowable speculation or rumor
possibly originating with political enemies or those who, after the fact,
wanted to pile on.
His father was brutal, so much can be discerned, and mother
was a doormat. And no doubt there was something extremely strange about Hitler
from adolescence on—most notably, from the historical record, the absence of
any real human relationships. Everywhere, he stood apart; those who got close
to him testified to a sense of never really knowing him, a sense of someone
always acting, playing a part. It’s a
common enough experience around run-of-the-mill narcissists and phonies. Hitler
seemed to have this quality of “something missing” to a very great degree. The
“un-person” is Kershaw’s term for this enduring blank space, and it works as a
way to understand what must have been a deeply ingrained, and comprehensive
disorder of personality. When Hitler would find his place as an agitator and
beer-hall speaker, the un-person would find a convenient way to hide his
deformity, by projecting outward and upward an image to which millions of
Germans became enthralled.
In this it has to be said that Hitler possessed, distinctly,
a kind of genius, that happened also to be wed to a ferocious
single-mindedness. Very often it took the form of a negative kind of genius, an
instinct for the long game, a knack for waiting out his enemies, a willingness
to dissemble and play nice when it suited his purposes, and an eye for his
adversary’s weaknesses. His one positive, or “creative” talent was
speaking—more precisely, propaganda, what today we would call “messaging.” He
grasped intuitively, instinctively, what the German people wanted at that time,
in those circumstances, after so much misfortune: a Fuhrer—and then he became
that thing. It was a conscious projection, a kind of trick of acting, of making
his own un-personhood disappear—so that the real man, the absurd, weird looking,
unsmiling guy with the bad mustache didn’t really matter. He projected it
upward and outward away from himself, as if he were painting on the sky; people
looked up and when he shouted and shook his fist at those rallies, what they
saw was the charismatic leader, the Fuhrer, they needed.
The man had an unpromising start, to say the least. He
wanted to be an artist, spent some time in Vienna where he applied to the
Vienna Art Institute. Denied, he was crestfallen. He spent a lot of time
scrounging around Vienna selling paintings and drawings in bars or wherever
else he could, and imbibed the politics of the era, including the potent
anti-semitism. He lived in a men’s home, was regarded as a weird bird with
strong opinions. It is easy enough to imagine him, at this stage, aging as a crank
and an oddball.
The war that broke out in Europe in 1914 was a destiny
changer. He enlisted and served as a sentry, showing some bravery and earning a
medal for it. Toward the end, in October 1918, when every “norm” had been
shattered and poison gas came into use at the front, Hitler was partially
blinded in a mustard gas attack by the French at Yrpes. He was hospitalized,
and for the failed artist for whom the war was an escape from the emptiness of
his un-personhood, it was over. “And little though he knew it,” Kershaw writes,
“the Army High Command was already maneuvering to extricate itself from blame
for a war it accepted was lost and a peace which would soon have to be
negotiated.”
One month later, with Germany bankrupt and depleted by war, the
German socialist workers party staged an uprising. Amid extreme chaos and an
extraordinary amount of political violence on all sides, the socialists came to
power and established, briefly, a highly unstable Soviet-style republic. “It
lasted little more than a fortnight,” Kershaw writes. “But it ended in
violence, bloodshed, and deep recrimination…..”
The importance of the 1918 revolution and Germany’s
capitulation (after four years of propaganda lies from the high command that it
was winning the war) cannot be overstated. A conspiracy theory that Germany’s war
effort was sabotaged by Bolshevik Jews—the “stab in the back”— gained wide
currency. For Hitler, it became an enduring obsession, down to his dying day. Revenge
on “the November criminals” can reasonably be regarded as the motivating
element in everything Hitler would do for the rest of his life.
(Christopher Hitchens, in his review of Kershaw’s work,
emphasizes, as well, the likely lasting importance of Hitler’s experience of being
gassed. That makes sense. It is easy to imagine the experience as one that
never quite goes away entirely—the odor, the severe pain it causes in joints
and limbs and behind the eyes.)
During the war, Hitler had become known among the ranks as a
fanatic, and he attracted the attention of military higher-ups after the
socialist republic was overthrown, replaced by an uneasy coalition of mainstream
parties and the military. Hitler hadn’t wanted to return to civilian life, and
he was spared that fate when one Captain Karl Mayr became the first of Hitler’s
many, many enablers, hiring him as a speaker or “educator” in anti-Bolshevik
courses for the troops. In Mein Kampf he would record this revelation—“I could
speak”—as seminal. From there it was on to the beerhalls where he earned a
widening following and would in time assume leadership of the National
Socialist German Workers Party.
“Gathering storm” is a cliché hard to avoid as the rest
unfolds. The darkness does gather, at first out on the horizon, seemingly
ignorable, but inexorably marches in closer: social and civic unrest as the
shambling Weimar republic totters; growing strength of the Nazi party along
with the enervation of the mainstream parties; rise of the Brownshirts; the failed
Beer Hall Putsch and Hitler’s trial in which he was treated as a kind of
renegade celebrity, speechifying in a way that actually managed to increase his
popularity; the stint in jail where he wrote Mein Kampf; consolidation of
Hitler’s power within the Nazi party following his release from prison; the
Night of the Long Knives, when Hitler had to shatter the growing power of the
Brownshirts; the fall of the Weimar Republic and Hitler’s ascension to power; the
systematic destruction of all other parties and of independent civic life (with
the notable exception of the churches) that did not conform itself to Nazi
goals; Hitler’s early successes—especially the re-entry of German troops into
the disputed Ruhr valley—and the growing Fuhrer-cult that grew up around the
man.
“Perfect storm” is another one. Things fall in place for
Hitler all along the way. There’s that luck of his. But there are also a lot of
people in positions to thwart Hitler and put him in his place, but who found it
convenient for one reason or another to accommodate him. Hitler had gathered up
through the years a nationwide following of brutal, violent, racist thugs, and
lots of people were frightened of it. Quite a lot of others, including military
types and the cultured elite, saw Hitler as a vulgar crank, gauche and
ridiculous. But his power was such that he couldn’t be ignored. Chief among the
reasons for why he was tolerated by so many who knew better, was the fear of
socialism, more particularly of Soviet-style bolshevism, shared by virtually
everyone in the country, and disgust with Weimar-style democracy, regarded by
many as “un-German,” a foreign import. Emblematic is the cartoonish, top-hatted
Franz von Papen, the industrialist who was instrumental in allowing Hitler to
assume the Chancellorship, believing he and allies in the military and business
could contain him, could use him for their own purposes (destroying socialism,
defending private enterprise, ending the mess that was Weimar democracy). They
underestimated him mightily, but they wouldn’t know that for a while. “We’ve
hired him out,” Papen said.
I don’t know about you, but I love that (maybe it’s the “believe
me”) and enjoy imagining Helena as a languid Weimar vixen for whom not a lot is
new under the sun and who might have spotted from a million miles away an
overcompensating loser. The Hanfstaengls introduced him to the high life in Munich. “In
his gangster hat and trenchcoat over his dinner jacket, touting a pistol and
carrying as usual his dog-whip, he cut a bizarre figure in the salons of Munich’s
upper-crust.”
*****
The really scary part of Kershaw’s story describes the
growing radicalization of the entire German society under Hitler’s
dictatorship, what Kershaw calls “working toward the Fuhrer”—how all sectors of civil
society were expected to “do their part” toward realizing what were assumed to be the
Fuhrer’s goals, racial purification especially. It’s here where the German people themselves
become most culpable. It's also here where you can begin to believe in something like
supernatural evil, something demonic, some
unholy force that took on a momentum no longer containable--radicalization begot radicalization, as norms, one after the others, were shattered.
Alas, it is the great virtue of good historians to remind us that all of history is, finally, human history. Like Lanzmann’s Shoah, Kershaw’s detailed account of the period shows us there was nothing supernatural about it. It was the culmination of specific policies, procedures, protocols, actions by individuals—stupid, blind, arrogant, greedy, self-interested or cowardly—arising out of a specific culture at a time and in a place where it all was possible. More than possible, it all seems--such is the command of Kershaw's narrative--logically predictable. “Every system is perfectly designed to get the results it gets,” goes the clever contemporary aphorism of systems analysis. And so it was, once upon a time in Germany, 1933-1945.
Alas, it is the great virtue of good historians to remind us that all of history is, finally, human history. Like Lanzmann’s Shoah, Kershaw’s detailed account of the period shows us there was nothing supernatural about it. It was the culmination of specific policies, procedures, protocols, actions by individuals—stupid, blind, arrogant, greedy, self-interested or cowardly—arising out of a specific culture at a time and in a place where it all was possible. More than possible, it all seems--such is the command of Kershaw's narrative--logically predictable. “Every system is perfectly designed to get the results it gets,” goes the clever contemporary aphorism of systems analysis. And so it was, once upon a time in Germany, 1933-1945.